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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986 Missouri passed a statute which stated that "[tihe life
of each human being begins at conception"' and required that the
"laws of . .[Missouri] shall be interpreted and construed to ac-
knowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of develop-
ment, all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to all
other persons ... , In enacting the statute, the legislature stated
1. Mo. REv. STAT.§ 1.205.1(1) (1986).
2. Mo. REV. STAT.§ 1.205.2 (1986). Section 1.205 provides in full:
1. The general assembly of this state finds that:
(1) The life of each human being begins at conception;
(2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life,
health, and well-being;
(3) The natural parents of unborn children have protectable
interests in the life, health, and well-being of their
unborn child.
2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be interpreted
and construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every
stage of development, all the rights, privileges, and immunities available
to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state, subject only to the
Constitution of the United States, and decisional interpretations thereof
by the United States Supreme Court and specific provisions to the con-
trary in the statutes and constitution of this state.
3. As used in this section, the term 'unborn children' or 'unborn child'
shall include all unborn child or [sic] children or the offspring of human
beings from the moment of conception until birth at every stage of bio-
logical development.
4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as creating a cause of ac-
tion against a woman for indirectly harming her unborn child by failing
to properly care for herself or by failing to follow any particular program
of prenatal care.
The statute also raised several other issues decided by the Supreme Court,
most notably the issues of public funding of abortion, use of public facilities for
abortion, and mandated testing for fetus viability. Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). This article takes no position on any of
these other issues. Its sole concern is the legislative determination that human life
[Vol. 12:1
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that "tilt is the intention of the general assembly of the state of
Missouri to grant the right of life to all humans, born and
unborn.. .. "I
The effect of this statute is to declare that personhood is con-
ferred at the moment of conception and that all existing and fu-
ture legislation in Missouri must be interpreted from this view-
point.4  This article contends that the Missouri legislative
statement is a theologically derived finding that personhood begins
at the moment of conception. Such an inherently theological and
controversial determination violates a core purpose of the estab-
lishment clause of the first amendment, the absolute prohibition
against government preference of one religious sect or denomina-
tion over another and the placing of the state's imprimatur on a
particular religious dogma. What follows is a synopsis of the reli-
gious debate over whether human life begins at conception. Next is
a discussion of the statute in light of this debate in the context of
establishment clause jurisprudence. The article will then conclude
with a review of the Supreme Court decision and its implications.
II. THE RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSY
Although the statements by the U.S. Catholic Conference,
Missouri Synod Lutherans, segments of the Southern Baptist Con-
vention and evangelicals in Missouri may present a uniform theo-
logical view about when human life or personhood commences,'
other denominations and religious traditions reject the theological
concept that human life or personhood begins at the time of
conception.
For example, Rabbis Raymond Zwerin and Richard I. Shapiro
begins at conception.
3. Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.010 (1986).
4. This interpretation of the effect of the statutory language is not a minority
position. See Brief for 127 Members of the Missouri General Assembly as Amicus
Curiae supporting Appellants at 10; Brief of the Lutheran Church-Missouri
Synod, the Christian Life Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, and
the National Association of Evangelicals as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants
at 4; Brief of Amicus Curiae Missouri Catholic Conference in Support of Appel-
lants at 1-2. The Missouri Catholic Conference is one of two organizations that
actually prepared the language of the statute. See State Paid Abortions- Not
Here, 30 May MCC Messenger 1986 at 1. The other organization responsible for
the language is Missouri Citizens for Life. See Abortion Law was Work of Chris-
tians, 23 Jan. Kansas City Times 1989.
5. See supra note 4.
19891
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write that "according to Jewish law, a fetus is not considered a full
human being and has no juridical personality of its own .... The
Talmud contains the expression Ubar yereah imo - the fetus is as
the thigh of its mother, i.e., the fetus is deemed to be part and
parcel of the pregnant woman's body."' Another prominent Jewish
leader, Rabbi Henry Siegman, Executive Director of the American
Jewish Congress, testified before Congress that "the fetus is not a
person, in the Jewish tradition, until the moment of birth. . .. "I
Professor Paul D. Simmons, Professor of Christian Ethics at
the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, notes:
Perhaps the major issue in the abortion debate centers on the
question of the personhood of the fetus. Those who are working
for a constitutional "human life" amendment to ban abortion in
America argue that the Bible teaches (1) that the fetus is a
human being and (2) that abortion is murder and thus should be
legally prohibited.'
Adding that some traditional religious communities do not
agree with the proposition that human life or personhood begins at
the moment of conception, Professor Simmons explains:
Not all scholars are convinced that the Bible teaches that
abortion is murder or that the fetus is a person. John Stott, for
instance, rejects the notion that a fetus is a human being; he be-
lieves that at best, it may be regarded as potentially a person.
Several things might be noted about these statements. First,
writers use the terms "human," "human life," "life," "person,"
and "human being" as if they were synonymous terms and thus
interchangeable. Second, each statement reveals certain assump-
tions about what it means to be a human being or person. Third,
each writer brings the teaching of the Bible as that writer under-
stands it to buttress the argument. Finally, there is apparently no
single teaching or definition in the Bible regarding personhood, or
there would presumably be universal agreement among biblical
scholars on this question. To understand the question of the per-
sonhood of the fetus and relate the teachings of the Bible more
clearly to the question presented, it may prove helpful to deal
with some of the assumptions involved.'
6. Zwerin and Shapiro, Judaism & Abortion, 1-2 (1987).
7. Human Life Bill: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Separation of
Powers of the Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1981).
8. Simmons, Birth and Death: Bioethical Decision Making 78 (1985).
9. Id. at 79.
[Vol. 12:1
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After reviewing the Biblical view of personhood, 10 Simmons
concludes:
The Biblical portrait of person, therefore, is that of a com-
plex, many-sided creature with the godlike ability and responsi-
bility of making choices. The fetus - certainly in the early stages
of gestation, hardly meets those characteristics. At best, it begins
to attain those biological basics which are necessary to show ca-
pacities no earlier than the latter part of gestation. The "burden
of proof" argument used by those who would equate fetus with
person needs to be turned around. Brown argued, for instance,
that the burden of proof is on those who say that the fetus is not
a human being. "We must be able to say we are sure it is not
human .... How can we be sure it is not a human being?" No
one can disagree with him that the fetus is human. That is a sim-
ple statement that acknowledges the species to which the fetus
belongs. Human is an adjective. The fetus is not bovine (cow), or
feline (cat), but a human conceptus. The problem is asserting
that the fetus is a person or human being. The terms are not sy-
nonymous. "Human being" is a noun and designates or names a
living entity with the qualities of personality and life that distin-
guishes Homo Sapiens from all other creatures. Plainly the pres-
ence of life or animation is not a sufficient distinction, since all
animals have life in that sense. The uniqueness of being person is
reflecting the qualities of the image of God.11
Even the Catholic tradition presents conflicting though ac-
ceptable theological views as to the beginning of human life or per-
sonhood. Reviewing historic Roman Catholic writings on the sub-
ject, Whittier states:
For St. Thomas, "Seed and what is not seed is determined by
sensation of movement." What is destroyed in abortion of the un-
formed fetus is seed, not man (emphasis added). This distinction
received its most careful analysis in St. Thomas. It was the gen-
eral belief of Christendom, reflected, for example, in the Council
of Trent (1545-1563), which restricted penalties for homicide to
abortion of animated fetus only."2
Whittier further notes:
In 1869 in his Apostolic Constitution Apostolicae Sedis Pope
10. Id. at 87-88.
11. Simmons, Birth and Death: Bioethical Decision Making (1985).
12. C. Whittier, Catholic Teaching on Abortion: Its Origin and Later Devel-
opment 18 (1981).
19891
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Pius IX broke with the older tradition by omitting all distinctions
in canonical penalties between the unformed and the formed fe-
tus. The effect was implicitly to accept the theory of immediate
ensoulment or, at least, to provide for it as a likely possibility. In
1917, with the promulgation of the new Code of Canon Law by
Benedict XV (1854-1922), the 40-80 day animation determina-
tion, still in effect for dealing with irregularities, was completely
eliminated. The definition of abortion as the ejection of an imma-
ture or non-viable fetus by deliberate intent and efficacious
means derives from Sixtus V. By fetus is meant the human organ-
ization in the womb after conception and before birth. In effect,
the teaching of Effraenatem and the Council of Elvira has be-
come the officially sanctioned position of the Church.' 3
Whittier concludes:
The official teaching of the Catholic Church at present was
stated in 1970 by the United States Catholic Bishops: 'from the
moment of conception the child is a complex and rapidly-growing
being endowed with the characteristics of human life'; in brief,
'the child in the womb is human.' This simply reasserts the judg-
ment of Vatican Council II: "From the moment of its conception,
life must be guarded with the greatest of care." Thus, in 1964,
Pope Paul VI cited the words of Pius XII 13 years
before: "Innocent human life, in whatever condition it is found, is
to be secure from the very first moment of its existence from any
direct deliberate attacks .... Whatever foundation there may be
for the distinction between these various phases of the develop-
ment of life that is born or still unborn, in profane or ecclesiasti-
cal law, and as regards certain civil and penal consequences, all
these cases involve a grave and unlawful attack upon the inviola-
bility of human life."
In conclusion, the pastoral and penitential practice of the
Catholic Church regarding abortion today is to act as if the soul
were present from the conception, assuming the possibility, if not
the probability, of fully human life or at least its unique potenti-
ality in the conceptus. This represents a significant change from
the dominant tradition in the past, which distinguished the un-
formed from the formed fetus in terms of canonical definition of
abortion and of appropriate penalties.14
In a similar vein, ecumenical dialogue sponsored by the Catho-
lic Bishops Committee for Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs of
13. Id. at 20.
14. Id. at 34-35.
[Vol. 12:1
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the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Caribbean
and North American Area Council of the World Alliance of Re-
formed Churches (Presbyterian and Congregational) issued a state-
ment on Ethics and Christian Unity, A Statement on Abortion
that notes substantial agreement on certain basic principles con-
cerning abortion but indicated substantial differences on "the mo-
ment and meaning of personhood," "the rights of the unborn in
situations where rights are in conflict," "the role of civil law in
matters pertaining to abortion," and "the interrelation of individ-
ual versus communal factors in decision-making."15
III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The developing establishment clause jurisprudence clearly ac-
cepts the proposition that mere parallelism between religious
dogma and legislative action does not in and of itself result in an
establishment clause violation." In fact, many traditional religious
15. Id. at 39.
16. Nothing stated in this article should be construed as criticizing the right
of religious organizations to speak out on important issues of moral and ethical
concern. As Justice Brennan wrote in McDaniel v. Paty:
That public debate of religious ideas, like any other, may arouse
emotion, may incite, may foment religious divisiveness and strife does
not rob it of constitutional protection .... The mere fact that a purpose
of the Establishment Clause is to reduce or eliminate religious divisive-
ness or strife, does not place religious discussion, association, or political
participation in a status less preferred than rights of discussion, associa-
tion and political participation generally. "Adherents of particular faiths
and individual churches frequently take strong positions on public issues
including ...vigorous advocacy of legal or constitutional positions. Of
course, churches as much as secular bodies and private citizens have that
right."
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 640-41 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970)).
Justice Brennan in his same concurrence added that "[t]he Establishment
Clause, properly understood, is a shield against any attempt by government to
inhibit religion .... It may not be used as a sword to justify repression of religion
or its adherents from any aspect of public life." Id. at 641. However, the fact that
religious organizations and their clergy have first amendment rights to speak out
on public issues and to seek to influence the political process in no way detracts
from the establishment clause proscription against government adopting a secta-
rian belief on issues that are essentially religious. As Justice Brennan concluded
in McDaniel v. Paty:
Our decisions under the Establishment Clause prevent government from
supporting or involving itself in religion or from being drawn into ecclesi-
astical disputes. These prohibitions naturally tend, as they were designed
1989]
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teachings may properly be the fountainhead from which commu-
nity morals may spring. However, disputed sectarian dogma may
not receive the imprimatur of the state as the stated purpose or
predicate for governmental legislative action.
A. Harris v. McRae
In Harris v. McRae,17 the Court stated:
It is well settled that 'a legislative enactment does not con-
travene the Establishment Clause if it has a secular legislative
purpose, if its principal or primary effect neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and if it does not foster an excessive governmen-
tal entanglement with religion.' Committee for Public Education
v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653. Applying this standard, the district
court properly concluded that the Hyde Amendment does not run
afoul of the Establishment Clause. Although neither a state nor
the federal government can constitutionally 'pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another,'
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15, it does not follow
that a statute violates the Establishment Clause because it 'hap-
pens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all reli-
gions.' McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 .... The Hyde
Amendment, as the district court noted, is as much a reflection of
to, to avoid channeling political activity along religious lines and to re-
duce any tendency toward religious divisiveness in society. Beyond en-
forcing these prohibitions, however, government may not go. The anti-
dote which the Constitution provides against zealots who would inject
sectarianism into the political process is to subject their ideas to refuta-
tion in the marketplace of ideas and their platforms to rejection at the
polls. With these safeguards, it is unlikely that they will succeed in in-
ducing government to act along religiously divisive lines, and, with judi-
cial enforcement of the Establishment Clause, any measure of success
they achieve must be short-lived, at best.
Id. at 642.
In addition, Justice Blackmun concluded in his dissent in Bowen v. Kendrick,
108 S.Ct. 2562, 2590 (1988), that secular values may be properly promoted by
legislation: "Whereas there may be secular values promoted by the AFLA, includ-
ing the encouragement of adoption and premarital chastity and the discourage-
ment of abortion, it can hardly be doubted that when promoted in theological
terms by religious figures, those values take on a religious nature."
Thus, although religious organizations have the constitutional right to speak
out on public questions, the ultimate protection remains within the political pro-
cess and with the courts to enforce the guarantee against establishment of
religion.
17. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
[Vol. 12:1
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"traditionalist values towards abortion, as it is an embodiment of
the views of any particular religion."... In sum, we are convinced
that the fact that the funding restrictions in the Hyde Amend-
ment may coincide with the religious tenets of the Roman Catho-
lic Church does not, without more, contravene the Establishment
Clause.18
Justice Stewart based part of his Harris v. McRae analysis on
the Court's decision in McGowan v. Maryland.19 In that case, this
Court specifically stated that a law may violate the establishment
clause "if it can be demonstrated that its purpose-evidenced ei-
ther on the face of the legislation, in conjunction with its legisla-
tive history, or in its operative effect-is to use the State's coercive
power to aid religion."2
In Harris v. McRae, the Court, although finding that a secular
legislative purpose may properly parallel a sectarian interest, im-
plied that a legislative body may nevertheless transgress the Estab-
lishment Clause when enacting anti-abortion legislation. In Harris
the Court merely acknowledged that the funding restrictions in the
Hyde Amendment may coincide with the religious tenets of the
Roman Catholic Church and would not, "without more," violate
the establishment clause.2
The Missouri legislation, however, does not merely coincide
with a sectarian teaching. Rather, the text of the statute itself re-
sults in a breach of the wall between church and state erected by
the establishment clause of the first amendment because the stat-
ute is predicated upon a theologically derived legislative finding
that "[tihe life of each human being begins at conception" 2 and a
requirement that "laws of ... [Missouri] shall be interpreted and
construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every
stage of development, all the rights, privileges, and immunities
available to all other persons .... "23 The legislature, in enacting
the statute, said its legislative purpose was "to grant the right of
life to all humans, born and unborn .... ""
These legislative findings and statement of purpose go beyond
a statement of "traditionalist values" represented by the Hyde
18. Id. at 319-20.
19. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
20. Id. at 453.
21. Harris, 448 U.S. at 320.
22. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205.1(1) (1986).
23. Id. § 1.205.2.
24. Id. § 188.010.
1989]
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Amendment, embrace theological dogma and are an attempt to
place the imprimatur of the state on one side of the theological
argument as to the "personhood" of a fetus.
In McRae v. Califano,2 5 the district court carefully observed
that the consensus of the legislative opinion that gave rise to the
passage of the Hyde Amendment prohibiting the use of federal
funds for abortion "did not in truth turn on whether an embryo or
fetus or, indeed, a zygote or blastocyst is a "human being."26 The
Missouri legislature, however, clearly predicated its legislation on a
purely theological finding-a finding which has not been validated
by a consensus within the medical or scientific community.
B. The Lemon Test
The Court, over the years, has used a three-part test to ana-
lyze establishment clause challenges: "First, the statute must have
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion.. .; finally,
the statute must not foster 'an excessive entanglement with
religion.' "27
25. 491 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd sub nor. Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980).
26. 491 F. Supp. at 715.
27. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13.(1971)(quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). Appellants (Webster et al.) and their support-
ing amici argued that the legislative finding is not an operative portion of the
statute but merely contributes to a general understanding of the statute.
Whatever merit that argument may have, the legislative declaration nevertheless
does clearly demonstrate that the legislative purpose was religiously based. Even
though the purpose prong of the Lemon test usually looks to the subjective intent
of the legislature, intent may be deduced from the face of the statute. Edwards v.
Aguillard, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 2585 (1987). Therefore, if the legislative finding con-
cerning when life begins is unnecessary to further the state's legitimate interests,
as claimed by appellants, an improper intent may be inferred. It may be con-
cluded that if the legislative declaration is unnecessary for the regulation of abor-
tion, then Missouri is not "paralleling" a religious belief, but adopting and en-
couraging one.
Appellants also argued that the state has a legitimate secular interest in regu-
lating all trimesters of a pregnancy. If this is so, there is no reason for a legislative
body to take the extra step and declare that life has in fact begun at the moment
of conception, particularly when this issue has not been decided by the medical or
scientific community and is the subject of continuing theological debate. Such a
legislative finding, therefore, serves no secular purpose but does demonstrate that
the legislative purpose is religiously based.
[Vol. 12:1
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1. The Purpose and Effect Prongs
More recently Justice O'Connor has suggested additional re-
finements to the traditional Lemon test which are helpful in the
analysis of the establishment clause issue present in Webster. In
Lynch v. Donnelly,28 Justice O'Connor, concurring, suggested that
the purpose prong goes to the issue of what government intended
to communicate by its action (the "objective" meaning of the
statement in the community), while the effects prong relates to
what message governmental action actually conveyed regardless of
whether it was intended (the "subjective" meaning of the state-
ment).2 9 Justice O'Connor analyzed the issue:
The meaning of a statement to its audience depends both on
the intention of the speaker and on the "objective" meaning of
the statement in the community. Some listeners need not rely
solely on the words themselves in discerning the speaker's intent:
they can judge the intent by, for example, examining the context
of the statement or asking questions of the speaker. Other listen-
ers do not have or will not seek access to such evidence of intent.
They will rely instead on the words themselves; for them the mes-
sage actually conveyed may be something not actually intended.
If the audience is large, as it always is when government "speaks"
by word or deed, some portion of the audience will inevitably re-
ceive a message determined by the "objective" content of the
statement, and some portion will inevitably receive the intended
message. Examination of both the subjective and the objective
components of the message communicated by a government ac-
tion is thereby necessary to determine whether the action carries
a forbidden meaning.
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether govern-
ment's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The
effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual
purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to either ques-
tion should render the challenged practice invalid.30
Justice O'Connor further suggested in Lynch v. Donnelly that
in reviewing the question of whether the action of government
28. 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
29. Id.
30. Id. See also, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" test was recently
accepted by Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Stevens. Allegheny County v.
Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
1989]
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"was understood to place its imprimatur on the religious content"
and thereby "communicates endorsement of religion is not a ques-
tion of simple historical fact." 1 Rather, the question, "like the
question whether racial or sex-based classifications communicate
an invidious message," is "in large part a legal question to be an-
swered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts.""2
Further, Justice O'Connor suggested that, in making such an
analysis:
Every government practice must be judged in its unique circum-
stances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or
disapproval of religion. In making that determination, courts
must keep in mind both the fundamental place held by the Es-
tablishment Clause in our constitutional scheme and the myriad,
subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values can be eroded.
Government practices that purport to celebrate or acknowledge
events with religious significance must be subjected to careful ju-
dicial scrutiny.33
In Wallace v. Jaffree,"4 Justice O'Connor, in applying her re-
fined Lemon test analysis to an issue substantially the same as the
question addressed here - that is, whether the purpose of the
"moment of silence" legislation enacted by the Alabama legislature
had the purpose of advancing religion - stated:
The crucial question is whether the State has conveyed or at-
tempted to convey the message that children should use the mo-
ment of silence for prayer. This question cannot be answered in
the abstract, but instead requires courts to examine the history,
language, and administration of a particular statute to determine
whether it operates as an endorsement of religion.3 5
In Wallace, Justice O'Connor also suggested that any inquiry
into the legislative purpose to determine establishment clause vio-
lations "should be deferential and limited" without attempting "to
psychoanalyze the legislators." 36 In Webster, however, that portion
of the text of the statute setting forth the aforementioned legisla-
tive finding and purpose of the legislation is inherently religious in
character. This, coupled with the acknowledgement that the legis-
31. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693.
32. Id. at 694.
33. Id.
34. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
35. Id. at 73-74.
36. Id. at 74.
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lation actually was co-drafted by the Missouri Catholic Confer-
ence, should have relieved the Court of any need for an intensive
investigation of legislative motive.
The establishment clause is violated by the advancement of a
particular religious belief.37 In Epperson v. Arkansas, 8 the Court
stated that a law should not "be tailored to the principles or
prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma."39 Nevertheless, this is
exactly what the Missouri legislature has done.
In Wallace v. Jaifree, Justice O'Connor in her concurrence
stated: "It is not a trivial matter, however, to require that the leg-
islature manifest a secular purpose and omit all sectarian endorse-
ments from its laws. That requirement is precisely tailored to the
Establishment Clause's purpose of assuring that government not
intentionally endorse religion or religious practice."40
It seems clear, as demonstrated earlier in. this article, that a
historic and contemporaneous link exists between the teachings of
certain religious groups and the human "life begins at the time of
conception" finding of the Missouri legislature. In Edwards v.
Aguillard"I the Court stated: "Because the primary purpose of the
Creationism Act is to advance a particular religious belief, the Act
endorses religion in violation of the First Amendment." '42 The
Court also stated that "[t]he plain meaning of the statute's words,
enlightened by their context and the contemporaneous legislative
history, can control the determination of legislative purpose."4 S In
Larson v. Valente," the Court stated that "[t]he clearest com-
mand of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomina-
tion cannot be officially preferred over another. 4 5 In Wallace v.
Jafree, Justice O'Connor reviewed her suggested modifications of
the Lemon test and stated:
Direct government action endorsing religion or a particular
37. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 574 (1987); Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39, 41 (1980); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
38. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
39. Id. at 106.
40. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75.
41. 482 U.S. 578 (1987)
42. Id. at 593.
43. Id at 594. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74 (1985)(O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S.
345, 397 (1956).
44. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
45. Id. at 244.
19891
13
Maddox and Bortnick: Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: Do Legislative Declarati
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1989
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
religious practice is invalid under this approach because it "sends
a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full mem-
bers of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community."... Under this view, Lemon's inquiry as to the pur-
pose and effect of a statute requires courts to examine whether
government's purpose is to endorse religion and whether the stat-
ute actually conveys a message of endorsement."6
Justice O'Connor continued:
A statute that ostensibly promotes a secular interest often has an
incidental or even a primary effect of helping or hindering a sec-
tarian belief. Chaos would ensue if every statute were invalid
under the Establishment Clause. For example, the state could not
criminalize murder for fear' that it would thereby promote the
Biblical command against killing. The task for the Court is to sort
out those statutes and government practices whose purpose and
effect go against the grain of religious liberty protected by the
First Amendment.
47
Justice O'Connor further stated:
The endorsement test does not preclude government from ac-
knowledging religion or from taking religion into account in mak-
ing law and policy. It does preclude government from conveying
or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular
religious belief is favored or preferred (emphasis added). Such an
endorsement infringes religious liberty of the non-adherents for
"[wihen the power, prestige and financial support of government
is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive
pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing of-
ficially approved religion is plain. '48
Here the power and direct coercive pressure of the state are exer-
cised on behalf of a sectarian teaching as to "personhood."
Under Justice O'Connor's "endorsement test," courts must ex-
amine whether a statute under review "in fact conveys a message
of endorsement," irrespective of the state's actual intent.4 9 As Jus-
tice O'Connor added in her concurrence in Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, "To ascertain whether the statute conveys a message of en-
dorsement, the relevant issue is how it would be perceived by an
46. Wallace 472 U.S. at 69-70.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 70 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
49. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
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objective observer acquainted with the text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute.""
Not only were Missouri Catholics informed through their own
church newspaper, the MCC Messenger, that the Missouri Catholic
Conference had co-authored, not merely promoted, the anti-abor-
tion statute enacted into law, but the general public was also in-
formed in the public newspaper that the Executive Director of the
Missouri Catholic Conference and the State Legislative Chairman
of Missouri Citizens for Life had "ghost written" the legislation."
In The Kansas City Times it was noted that the role played by the
Missouri Catholic Conference was no secret and quoted the Execu-
tive Director to the effect that "some critics of the proposal at the
time noted his involvement and charged that religious beliefs were
being advanced in the form of state legislation." 2
Also, if an objective observer reading the text of the Missouri
statute considers the declaration of personhood contained in the
legislative findings as being unnecessary to achieve a valid state
interest, then the effect of the statement would be to convey a
message that the particular theological theory of life is "favored or
preferred."" In essence, if the legislative finding does not further
the state's interest, and is in fact an encroachment into a religious
area, then both the actual purpose and effect must be to endorse a
particular religious viewpoint.
At the very least, the legislative finding made by the Missouri
legislature sets forth a legislative preference for a specific theologi-
cal idea. As Justice Blackmun stated recently, "A statutory prefer-
ence for the dissemination of religious ideas offends our most basic
understanding of what the Establishment Clause is all about and
hence is constitutionally intolerable.54
In Thomas v. Review Board,55 the Court reasserted the princi-
ple that "[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation. '" If
this is beyond the competence of the Judicial Branch, it is equally
outside the domain of the Legislative Branch.
Although noting in Wallace v. Jaffree that it is possible that a
50. 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987).
51. See supra, note 4.
52. See supra, note 4.
53. Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985).
54. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock. 109 S. Ct. 890, 907 (1989)(Blackman, J.,
concurring).
55. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
56. Id. at 716.
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legislature will enunciate a sham secular purpose for a statute, nev-
ertheless Justice O'Connor had "little doubt that our courts are
capable of distinguishing a sham secular purpose from a sincere
one, or that the Lemon inquiry into the effect of an enactment
would help decide those close cases where the validity of an ex-
press secular purpose is in doubt."' Arguments that the legislative
purpose was based upon secular concerns are belied by the secta-
rian foundation of the legislative action. According to Justice
O'Connor, "While the secular purpose requirement alone may
rarely be determinative in striking down a statute, it nevertheless
serves an important function. It reminds government that when it
acts it should do so without endorsing a particular religious belief
or practice that all citizens do not share. '"58
The Missouri legislature specifically stated that its finding
that "the life of each human being begins at conception ' 59 is to be
utilized in interpreting and construing the laws of the state. Thus,
the suggestion that the findings and purpose portion of the statute
is not operative is pure fiction. Apparently such a mandated inter-
pretation would apply to both existing and prospective legislation.
The legislature specifically stated that "the laws of this state shall
be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on behalf of the un-
born child at every stage of development, all the rights, privileges,
and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents
of this state, subject only to the Constitution of the United States,
and decisional interpretations thereof by the United States Su-
preme Court and specific provisions to the contrary in the statutes
and construction of this state.""°
2. The Entanglement Prong
It is clear that the legislature in this case went beyond restrict-
ing the use of public funds or facilities in abortions. It attempted
to place a theological interpretation on all existing and future leg-
islation touching on "the unborn child at every stage of develop-
ment." Such a statutory requirement portends a myriad of unpre-
dictable ways for wreaking havoc in the future.
In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
57. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75.
58. Id. at 75-76.
59. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205.1(1) (1986).
60. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.2 (1986).
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Nyquist,1 the Court indicated that the "potential for political di-
visiveness" was relevant in determining whether legislation created
excessive entanglement between church and state. In Nyquist this
Court noted that: "while the prospects for such divisiveness may
not alone warrant the invalidation of state laws..., it is certainly a
'warning signal' not to be ignored." 2
In Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice O'Connor in her concurring
opinion stated that "[p]olitical divisiveness is admittedly an evil
addressed by the Establishment Clause. Its existence may be evi-
dence that institutional entanglement is excessive or that a govern-
ment practice is perceived as an endorsement of religion."6
61. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
62. Id. at 797-98.
63. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689. There also was one other issue raised in some of
the briefs supporting the appellants that deserves attention. In Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 132-33 (1973), the Court recognized that "abortion performed before
'quickening' was not an indictable offense at common law and that "[t]he absence
of a common-law crime for pre-quickening abortion appears to have developed
from a confluence of earlier philosophical, theological, and civil and canon law
concepts of when life begins."
The Court also acknowledged that "the law in effect until mid-nineteenth
century was the pre-existing English common law" and that by the end of the
1950's a large majority of jurisdictions banned abortion "unless done to save or
preserve the life of the mother." Id. at 138-39. The Court also noted that "at the
time of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the
nineteenth century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under most
American statutes" in effect at the time of the Roe v. Wade decision. Id. at 140.
A number of amicus briefs filed in Webster in support of the appellants ar-
gued that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution somehow
changed the common law and somehow included a fetus as a "person" who could
neither be deprived of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law" nor
be denied the "equal protection of the law." For instance, the brief of a number of
religious pro-life groups addresses "the personhood, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, of human beings conceived but not yet born." Amicus Brief of
Catholics United for Life at 4. That brief argues that the "absence or dearth of
case support for unborn personhood is irrelevant" and takes a gigantic leap in
logic by citing Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1449 (1862) (Sen. Sumner) tying
such a concept to the proposition that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended that "in the eyes of the Constitution, every human being within its
sphere ... from the President to the slave, is a person." Id. at 7, 14.
Similarly, the amicus brief of the Knights of Columbus argues that "viability
is an invalid benchmark for construing the meaning of 'person' in the Fourteenth
Amendment because it has nothing to do with attributes of personhood, or a par-
ticularized state of being, but only the state of medical technology." Brief of the
Knights of Columbus at 2. In effect, the Knights of Columbus would have this
Court substitute Roman Catholic theology for "medical technology," the sectarian
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In a plurality opinion of the Court Justice Renquist upheld
the statutory language as constitutionally permissible." Ignoring
the establishment clause issue altogether, he interpreted the lan-
guage as representing a value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion, permissible under abortion law jurisprudence. 5 He did
not view it as a regulation of abortion based on the idea that life
begins at conception. Noting that under state law the fetus may
receive certain protections and rights that meet constitutional cri-
teria, he held that unborn children under the Missouri statute
could receive protection in tort and probate law, but that the stat-
ute could be "interpreted to do no more than that.""0 If, however,
the Missouri courts later interpret the language to restrict the "ac-
tivities of the appellees in some concrete way, 6 7 then the federal
courts would take up that issue at that time.
Justice Stevens, dissenting, was the only member of the Court
for the secular.
Even the Knights of Columbus brief admits, however, that "the legislative
history of the [Fourteenth] Amendment make no explicit reference to unborn or
to abortion." Id. at 18. Whether the term "human being" includes all unborn chil-
dren to the time of their conception also is not demonstrated in any Fourteenth
Amendment generated case law, and, therefore, would rest solely on church
dogma or teaching.
The amicus briefs of Catholics United for Life and Knights of Columbus fo-
cus on what they perceive to have been the prevailing mood of the nation and the
existing abortion laws at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.
Then, ipse dixit, they engraft on the Fourteenth Amendment the concept that its
protection of "persons" includes a fetus. This argument ignores the fact that the
common law and the prevailing view at the time of the adoption of our Constitu-
tion and the Bill of Rights fails to support any such notion.
The Fifth Amendment contains the same type of language and restraint as
does the Fourteenth Amendment. Both provide that a "person" shall not be de-
prived of "life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law." The only
difference is that the Fifth Amendment proscribes actions by the federal govern-
ment, and the Fourteenth prevents similar action by state governments. How
ironic it would be if the same language within the Constitution could produce
distinctly different results according to whether the action is federal or state. It is
more logical to believe that the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment, in using
the word "persons," had in mind the same definition of persons as used by the
drafters of the Bill of Rights.
64. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 3050.
67. Id.
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to address the establishment clause issue. 8 His attack on the stat-
ute was two pronged, though each prong would be sufficient in it-
self to overturn the statute as a violation of the establishment
clause.
The first attack concerns the limiting effect the statute con-
ceivably would have on a woman's choice of contraception, in vio-
lation of Griswold v. Connecticut" and its progeny.70 He reasoned
that the statute makes a distinction between those contraceptive
procedures that are effective immediately before fertilization and
those immediately after fertilization. This reasoning follows from
the statute's definition of conception, which defines it as "the fer-
tilization of the ovum of a female by the sperm of a male," 1 even
though "standard medical texts equate 'conception' with implanta-
tion in the uterus, occuring about six days after fertilization. '7 2
Thus contraceptive devices such as the morning-after pill or the
IUD (which works primarily by preventing a fertilized egg from
implanting) would be at least regulated in some unconstitutional
way if not altogether prohibited. Since the distinction between the
pre and post fertilization contraceptive methods73 is theological
and not secular, then Stevens concludes that the language is inva-
lid under Griswold and its progeny, since legislation requires a sec-
ular basis. 74
The second prong, a more direct attack using the Establish-
ment Clause as support, is in many ways a continuation of the first
argument. The distinction is that the first argument is based
mostly on the privacy issue raised in Griswold and its progeny.
The secular purpose discussion is very brief and seems to be in-
cluded as an afterthought, and it certainly is not necessary to make
the argument that the narrowing of contraceptive choice violates
the privacy doctrine. Anyhow, it is the second prong in which Jus-
68. Id. at 3079 (Stevens, J., Dissenting).
69. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
70. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3081.
71. Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.015(3) (1986).
72. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3080.
73. It would be improper to infer that the pre and post fertilization distinc-
tion with regard to contraception would include abortion. Though there are peo-
ple who view abortion as another form of contraception, Stevens makes it clear
that he is talking about contraceptives that take effect immediately after fertiliza-
tion, before the egg implants itself into the wall of the uterus.
74. Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3082 (citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40
(1980) (per curiam)). This case held that the establishment clause is violated by
the advancement of a particular religious belief. Id. at 3040.
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tice Stevens directly uses the Establishment Clause to dissent from
the majority holding.
In this argument Stevens readily admits that his conclusion
does not follow from the fact that the language happens to coin-
cide with the tenets of certain religions,7 5 nor does it follow from
the fact that the motivations of the legislature may have been reli-
gious. 6 It does, however, follow directly from the fact that it is an
"unequivocal endorsement of a religious tenet of some but by no
means all Christian faiths. . .[serving] no identifiable secular pur-
pose. ' 77 Citing Whittier, he focuses on St. Thomas's distinction of
a fetus that was younger than forty days old and one that was
older."8 Before the forty days, abortion was not the destruction of
human life but of its "seed".79 Stevens argues that it is clear that
the Court would not have upheld legislation stating life begins at
forty days; that would be an endorsement of a particular religious
tenet." Therefore, this Missouri statute should also be held uncon-
stitutional since there is no principled secular distinction between
St. Thomas's forty days and Missouri's declaration that human life
begins at conception; the distinction is merely theological.8'
Indeed Stevens readily admits that the language would be
constitutional if there was some identifiable secular purpose.2 He
briefly discusses a few possibilities but ends up rejecting them.83
Even the plurality's decision that the language is in effect an
amendment to tort, property, and criminal laws is rejected as not
persuasive.84 On one hand, none of these "amendments" is fur-
75. Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3082 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20
(1980); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961.))
76. Id. (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1956) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
77. Id. at 3082. It is unclear from this statement whether Stevens would ac-
cept a statute that was an endorsement of Judeo-Christian beliefs but not of
others, such as Islam.
78. Id. at 3083 (citing C, Whittier, Catholic Teaching on Abortion: Its Origin
and Later Development. Actually, the forty day distinction was only applicable to
males. For females, it was eighty days.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 3083- 84.
82. Id. at 3084.
83. Id. For example, the often stated secular interest of preventing fetus pain
or mental anguish is not valid for a one cell fetus. Nor can it be argued that there
is a secular interest in bolstering the human population in the United States. In-
deed, national policy is the opposite with respect to unmarried adolescents.
84. Id.
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thered by the theological determination of when human life be-
gins.8 On the other, the Missouri state constitutiori specifically
prohibits legislative enactments on more than one subject matter.8 6
Finally, Stevens argues that the language violates the establish-
ment clause by noting: the intensely divisive character of the na-
tional debate over the abortion issue reflects the deeply held reli-
gious convictions of many participants in the debate.8 The
Missouri Legislature may not inject its endorsement of a particular
religious tradition into this debate, for "[t]he Establishment
Clause does not allow public bodies to foment such
disagreement. 88
In conclusion, Stevens writes:
Contrary to the theological "finding" of the Missouri Legisla-
ture, a woman's constitutionally protected liberty encompasses
the right to act on her own belief that- to paraphrase St.
Thomas Aquinas- until a seed has acquired the powers of sensa-
tion and movement, the life of a human being has not begun.89
V. CONCLUSION
It is both puzzling and disturbing that eight of the nine Jus-
tices of the Court did not even address the establishment clause
issue. Though it seems clear that the language of the Missouri stat-
ute directly conflicts with the first amendment provision, only Jus-
tice Stevens takes up the issue. Whatever their reasons, the Su-
preme Court has apparently abdicated establishment clause
jurisprudence in order to set forth its various views pertaining to
abortion without any other jurisprudential "distractions." This
type of neglect by our highest court only serves to undermine con-
fidence in its current composition to uphold fundamental and ina-
lienable provisions of the Constitution. While the Court viciously
debates abortion, Missouri has made significant intrusions into the
basic right of no religious establishment. The Court must not be
distracted by other important issues to the point of permitting an
"end run" on our most basic and fundemental liberties.
85. Id. at 3085
86. Id. at 3084-85.
87. Id. at 3085.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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